1.
Montero, M., & Sheth, J. D. (2021).
Naivety about hidden information: An experimental investigation
.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, 192, 92-116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.032
The unraveling prediction of disclosure theory relies on the idea that strategic forces lead firms (information senders) to voluntarily disclose information about the quality of their products provided the information disclosed is verifiable and the costs of disclosure are negligible. This theoretical prediction requires that consumers (information receivers) hold correct beliefs about non-disclosed information and, in equilibrium, treat all non-disclosed information with extreme skepticism. Previous research finds that receivers are insufficiently skeptical, or in other words are naive, about non-disclosed information, which leads to the failure of unraveling. This paper examines the extent to which naivety responds systematically to features of the decision environment, namely the availability of opportunities to communicate with others (Consultation treatment) and the context of the experimental setting (Context treatment, based on hygiene ratings). We find that complete unraveling fails to occur in all our treatments. Receiver's beliefs and guesses about non-disclosed information are similar across the Consultation and Context treatments relative to the Baseline implying that receivers are naive about non-disclosed information under naturalistic features that exist in field settings. We also find that senders are partly to blame for the lack of unraveling, as intermediate types would gain from disclosing more often given the observed receiver behavior.
2.
Adriani, F., Matheson, J. A., & Sonderegger, S. (2018).
Teaching by example and induced beliefs in a model of cultural transmission
.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, 145, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.031
We augment standard models of cultural transmission with an explicit account of social learning, grounded in the information transmission literature. Youngsters observe the behavioral trait of a role model and form beliefs about the desirability of that trait. Adults have better information about each trait and have a paternalistic attitude toward their children. This makes them reluctant to adopt myopic behavior to avoid setting a negative example to their children. This signaling distortion increases in the influence parents have over their offspring. We extend the model to allow parental influence to depend on the population frequency of each trait and show that cultural complementarity does not imply convergence to a homogeneous population. We find empirical support for a positive relationship between parental influence and propensity to exert self-restraint by looking at alcohol and tobacco consumption.
3.
Jensen, M. K., & Kozlovskaya, M. (2016).
A representation theorem for guilt aversion
.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, 125, 148-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.02.001
Guilt aversion has been shown to play an important role in economic decision-making. In this paper, we take an axiomatic approach to guilt by deducing a utility representation from a list of easily interpretable assumptions on an agent's preferences. It turns out that our logarithmic representation can mitigate the problem of multiplicity of equilibria to which psychological games are prone. We apply the model in three well-known games and show that its predictions are consistent with experimental observations.


Filter results by:

Journal: American Economic Review (2), Review of Economic Studies (3), Review of Economics and Statistics, Management Science, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, Journal of the European Economic Association (4), Economic Journal (2), Journal of Economic Theory (5), Journal of International Economics (2), Economics Letters (2), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (3), Games and Economic Behavior (5), Journal of Banking and Finance, European Economic Review (2), Annals of Operations Research (2), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2), Economic Theory (2), Economics of Education Review, International Economic Review, RAND Journal of Economics (2), Environmental and Resource Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Psychology, Theoretical Economics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Industrial Economics, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Theory and Decision (2), Journal of Comparative Economics, Resource and Energy Economics (2), International Journal of Game Theory, Oxford Economic Papers, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Mathematical Social Sciences (2), International Journal of Finance and Economics, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies (2), Brain Communications, Dynamic Games and Applications, Games (2),

Year: 2024 (2), 2023 (12), 2022 (5), 2021 (7), 2020 (6), 2019 (5), 2018 (13), 2017 (11), 2016 (9), 2015 (11)