1.
Jensen, M. K., & Luo, R. (2024).
The plague, the skill-premium, and the road to modern economic growth
. Macroeconomic Dynamics, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100523000573
2.
Hinnosaar, T. (2023).
Optimal Sequential Contests
.
Theoretical Economics
,
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R\\\&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests and discuss the limit to perfectly competitive outcomes under different disclosure rules.
3.
Burdea, V., Montero, M., & Sefton, M. (2023).
Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment
.
Games and Economic Behavior
,
We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We investigate the effect of evidence and verification control using three treatments: one where messages are unverifiable, one where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify and one where the sender has this verification control. First, we find that evidence helps the receiver. Second, despite significant differences in behavior across the two verification treatments, receivers’ payoffs do not differ significantly across these treatments, suggesting they are not hurt by delegating verification control. We also show that a theoretically optimal receiver commitment strategy identified by Glazer and Rubinstein is close to being an optimal response to senders’ observed behavior in both treatments.
4.
Montero, M., & Possajennikov, A. (2023). “Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games.
Annals of Operations Research
, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05179-8
This paper studies a simple process of demand adjustment in cooperative games. In the process, a randomly chosen player makes the highest possible demand subject to the demands of other coalition members being satisfied. This process converges to the aspiration set; in convex games, this implies convergence to the core. We further introduce perturbations into the process, where players sometimes make a higher demand than feasible. These perturbations make the set of separating aspirations, i.e., demand vectors in which no player is indispensable in order for other players to achieve their demands, the one most resistant to mutations. We fully analyze this process for 3-player games. We further look at weighted majority games with two types of players. In these games, if the coalition of all small players is winning, the process converges to the unique separating aspiration; otherwise, there are many separating aspirations and the process reaches a neighbourhood of a separating aspiration.
5.
Montero, M. (2023).
Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox
. In S. Kurz, N. Maaser, & A. Mayer (Eds.), Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century (159-171). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_10
It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better off as a result. This appears paradoxical, even more so since the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. The example shows that, even though actually being selected to propose is always valuable ex post, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.
6.
Giovannoni, F., & Hinnosaar, T. (2023).
Pricing Novel Goods
. In EC '23: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (737). https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597694
7.
Lane, T., Nosenzo, D., & Sonderegger, S. (2023).
Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence
.
American Economic Review
,
A large theoretical literature argues laws exert a causal effect on norms, but empirical evidence remains scant. Using a novel identification strategy, we provide a compelling empirical test of this proposition. We use incentivized vignette experiments to directly measure social norms relating to actions subject to legal thresholds. Our large-scale experiments (n=7000) run in the UK, US and China show that laws can causally influence social norms. Results are robust across different samples and methods of measuring norms, and are consistent with a model of social image concerns where individuals care about the inferences others make about their underlying prosociality.
8.
Albornoz, F., Calvo Pardo, H. F., Corcos, G., & Ornelas, E. (2023).
Sequentially exporting products across countries
.
Journal of International Economics
, 142, Article 103735. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103735
Exploiting disaggregated data on French exporters, we show that firms expand their product scope and geographical presence sequentially. This process of internationalization is uneven over time, exhibiting more volatility early than later in the life cycle of exporters. Specifically, young exporters are particularly likely to exit, and if they keep exporting, to expand at the intensive and sub-extensive margins, doing so by widening product scope within a destination before entering new destinations. We also find that firms' core products are particularly resilient despite being used to "test the waters" when entering additional countries. Existing models of firm export dynamics are not designed to explain these empirical regularities. We argue that they can be rationalized by a mechanism where new exporters are uncertain about the profitability of their products in different markets, but learn from their initial export experiences and then adjust their sales, number of products and destination countries accordingly.
9.
Albornoz, F., Contreras, D., & Upward, R. (2023). Let's stay together: The effects of repeat student-teacher matches on academic achievement.
Economics of Education Review
, 94, Article 102375. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2023.102375
We explore the effectiveness of repeating the student-teacher match on test scores, for the universe of 8th graders in Chile using information on all student-teacher matches across multiple subjects and years, and a national, anonymous measure of test scores. Using a fixed-effect and a regression discontinuity approach, we find that repeating matches has a robust positive effect on test scores. We show that this positive effect aggregates up to the student, class, and school-level, and also has longer-term effects on university admission exams. As channels, we find a significant positive effect on attendance, progression, student behaviour and teacher expectations. Reallocating teachers to classes with which they are familiar appears to offer a feasible strategy to improve student performance at low cost.
10.
Acemoglu, D., & Kaae Jensen, M. (2023).
Equilibrium Analysis in Behavioural One-Sector Growth Models
.
Review of Economic Studies
, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad043
Rich behavioral biases, mistakes and limits on rational decision-making are often thought to make equilibrium analysis much more intractable. We establish that this is not the case in the context of one-sector growth models such as Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans or Bewley-Aiyagari models. We break down the response of the economy to a change in the environment or policy into two parts: the direct response at the given (pre-tax) prices, and the equilibrium response which plays out as prices change. Our main result demonstrates that under weak regularity conditions, regardless of the details of behavioral preferences, mistakes and constraints on decision-making, the long-run equilibrium will involve a greater capital-labor ratio if and only if the direct response (from the corresponding consumption-saving model) involves an increase in aggregate savings. One implication of this result is that, from a qualitative point of view, behavioral biases matter for long-run equilibrium if and only if they change the direction of the direct response. We provide detailed illustrations of how this result can be applied and generates new insights using models of misperceptions, self-control and temptation, and naive and sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
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