I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R\\\&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests and discuss the limit to perfectly competitive outcomes under different disclosure rules.

We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We investigate the effect of evidence and verification control using three treatments: one where messages are unverifiable, one where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify and one where the sender has this verification control. First, we find that evidence helps the receiver. Second, despite significant differences in behavior across the two verification treatments, receivers’ payoffs do not differ significantly across these treatments, suggesting they are not hurt by delegating verification control. We also show that a theoretically optimal receiver commitment strategy identified by Glazer and Rubinstein is close to being an optimal response to senders’ observed behavior in both treatments.

This paper studies a simple process of demand adjustment in cooperative games. In the process, a randomly chosen player makes the highest possible demand subject to the demands of other coalition members being satisfied. This process converges to the aspiration set; in convex games, this implies convergence to the core. We further introduce perturbations into the process, where players sometimes make a higher demand than feasible. These perturbations make the set of separating aspirations, i.e., demand vectors in which no player is indispensable in order for other players to achieve their demands, the one most resistant to mutations. We fully analyze this process for 3-player games. We further look at weighted majority games with two types of players. In these games, if the coalition of all small players is winning, the process converges to the unique separating aspiration; otherwise, there are many separating aspirations and the process reaches a neighbourhood of a separating aspiration.

It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better off as a result. This appears paradoxical, even more so since the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. The example shows that, even though actually being selected to propose is always valuable ex post, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.

Understanding the structure of time preferences allows for accurate predictions of the effects of changing intertemporal incentives. Behavioral models of present bias are used to rationalize field data seemingly at odds with exponential discounting, leveraging additional degrees of freedom to improve in-sample fit. Largely lacking to date are the critical out-of-sample tests necessary to ensure predictive accuracy. This paper contrasts exponential discounting with present-biased procrastination for around 22,000 tax filers, advancing the literature in this domain by providing novel out-of-sample tests for both theories. Present bias provides qualitatively better in-sample fit, matching substantial increases in filing probability as the tax deadline approaches. Present bias also has improved out-of-sample predictive power for responsiveness to the 2008 Stimulus Act, and experimental data demonstrate a link between present bias and filing times. Without present bias, predicted responses to changed incentives are inaccurate, demonstrating its necessity in research and policy applications.

A large theoretical literature argues laws exert a causal effect on norms, but empirical evidence remains scant. Using a novel identification strategy, we provide a compelling empirical test of this proposition. We use incentivized vignette experiments to directly measure social norms relating to actions subject to legal thresholds. Our large-scale experiments (n=7000) run in the UK, US and China show that laws can causally influence social norms. Results are robust across different samples and methods of measuring norms, and are consistent with a model of social image concerns where individuals care about the inferences others make about their underlying prosociality.

Exploiting disaggregated data on French exporters, we show that firms expand their product scope and geographical presence sequentially. This process of internationalization is uneven over time, exhibiting more volatility early than later in the life cycle of exporters. Specifically, young exporters are particularly likely to exit, and if they keep exporting, to expand at the intensive and sub-extensive margins, doing so by widening product scope within a destination before entering new destinations. We also find that firms' core products are particularly resilient despite being used to "test the waters" when entering additional countries. Existing models of firm export dynamics are not designed to explain these empirical regularities. We argue that they can be rationalized by a mechanism where new exporters are uncertain about the profitability of their products in different markets, but learn from their initial export experiences and then adjust their sales, number of products and destination countries accordingly.

We explore the effectiveness of repeating the student-teacher match on test scores, for the universe of 8th graders in Chile using information on all student-teacher matches across multiple subjects and years, and a national, anonymous measure of test scores. Using a fixed-effect and a regression discontinuity approach, we find that repeating matches has a robust positive effect on test scores. We show that this positive effect aggregates up to the student, class, and school-level, and also has longer-term effects on university admission exams. As channels, we find a significant positive effect on attendance, progression, student behaviour and teacher expectations. Reallocating teachers to classes with which they are familiar appears to offer a feasible strategy to improve student performance at low cost.

The aim of the paper is to determine the effects of the cognitive reserve on brain tumour patients’ cognitive functions and, specifically, if cognitive reserve helps patients cope with the negative effects of brain tumours on their cognitive functions. We retrospectively studied a large sample of around 700 patients, diagnosed with a brain tumour. Each received an MRI brain examination and performed a battery of tests measuring their cognitive abilities before they underwent neurosurgery. To account for the complexity of cognitive reserve, we construct our cognitive reserve proxy by combining three predictors of patients’ cognitive performance, namely, patients’ education, occupation, and the environment where they live. Our statistical analysis controls for the type, side, site, and size of the lesion, for fluid intelligence quotient, and for age and gender, in order to tease out the effect of cognitive reserve on each of these tests. Clinical neurological variables have the expected effects on cognitive functions. We find a robust positive effect of cognitive reserve on patients’ cognitive performance. Moreover, we find that cognitive reserve modulates the effects of the volume of the lesion: the additional negative impact of an increase in the tumour size on patients’ performance is less severe for patients with higher cognitive reserve. We also find substantial differences in these effects depending on the cerebral hemisphere where the lesion occurred and on the cognitive function considered. For several of these functions, the positive effect of cognitive reserve is stronger for patients with lesions in the left hemisphere than for patients whose lesions are in the right hemisphere. The development of prevention strategies and personalized rehabilitation interventions will benefit from our contribution to understanding the role of cognitive reserve, in addition to that of neurological variables, as one of the factors determining the patients’ individual differences in cognitive performance caused by brain tumours.