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Dirk Engelmann, Hans Peter Grüner, Timo Hoffmann and Alex Possajennikov,
2024-10-07
. "Minority Protection in Voting Mechanisms -- Experimental Evidence," SSRN.3.
Sabrina Auci, Manuela Coromaldi and Gianni De Fraja,
2024-09-25
. "School Autonomy and Pupils’ Performance: Academy Conversion in English Primary Schools," SSRN.4.
Gianni De Fraja, Jesse Matheson, Paul Mizen, James Rockey, Shivani Taneja and Gregory Thwaites,
2024-09-21
. "Remote Work and Compensation Inequality," SSRN.5.
Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov & Yuliet Verbel, 2024.
"Attribution of responsibility for currupt decisions,"
Discussion Papers
2024-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
This paper studies responsibility attribution for outcomes of collusive bribery. In an experiment, participants labeled as either citizens or public officials can propose a bribery transaction to another participant (labeled as either public official or citizen, respectively), who decides whether to accept the proposal. We then let either the victims of the corrupt transaction or the bystanders of it judge the individual decisions of proposing and accepting. We interpret these judgments as a measure of responsibility attribution. We find that labels (citizen or public official) have a stronger effect than roles (proposer or responder): public officials are consistently regarded as more responsible for corruption than citizens, while those accepting a bribe are regarded as only somewhat more responsible than those proposing it. Further, we find that victims judge corruption decisions more severely than bystanders, although bystanders’ judgments are also consistently negative. In treatments with a neutral context, we find that judgments are less harsh than in the corruption context, bystanders’ judgments are much less harsh than those of victims, and responders are judged more severely than proposers. Our results suggest that people judge corrupt actors in context, more harshly when they are labeled as law enforcers (i.e., public officials), and that unaffected parties (i.e., bystanders) react nearly as negatively to corruption as those directly affected by it (i.e., victims).
6.
Carlo Perroni & Kimberly Scharf & Sarah Smith & Oleksandr Talavera & Linh Vi, 2024.
"Local Crime and Prosocial Attitudes: Evidence from Charitable Donations,"
Discussion Papers
24-02, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
Using longitudinal postcode-level data on charitable donations made through a UK giving portal, combined with publicly available data on local crime and neighborhood characteristics, we study the relationship between local crime and residents’ charitable giving and exploring the mechanisms underlying this relationship. An increase in local crime corresponds to a significant rise in the overall volume of unscheduled charitable donations. This effect is primarily driven by the responses of female and gender-uncategorized donors. Donation responses also vary with postcode-specific socio-economic characteristics, mental health levels, and political leanings, but mainly so for female and gender-uncategorized donors.
7.
Surajeet Chakravarty, David Kelsey and Joshua C. Teitelbaum,
2024-02-07
. "Tort Liability and Unawareness," SSRN.8.
Masiko, T., Thornton, S., Celiksoy, E., Schwarz, K., Burcu, O., Peake, K., Landman, T., & Albornoz Crespo, F. (2024).
Harnessing UK Trade and Investment to Address Indo-Pacific Modern Slavery Risks
. Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre9.
Murphy, D., Oliver, M., Adkins, M., De Fraja, . G., & Chen, S. (2024).
An independent evaluation of the outcomes for looked after and vulnerable children attending boarding schools
. London: Royal National Children’s SpringBoard FoundationFilter results by:
Year: 2026, 2025 (6), 2024 (9), 2023 (5), 2022 (4)