Simona Mateut, Spiros Bougheas and Paul Mizen,
. "Trade credit, bank lending and monetary policy transmission," SSRN.
Dirk Engelmann, Hans Peter Grüner, Alex Possajennikov and Timo Hoffmann,
. "Minority Protection in Voting Mechanisms – Experimental Evidence," SSRN.
Under simple majority voting an absolute majority of voters may choose policies that are harmful to minorities. It is the purpose of sub- and super-majority rules to protect legitimate minority interests. We study how voting rules are chosen under the veil of ignorance. In our experiment, individuals choose voting rules for given distributions of gains and losses that can arise from a policy, but before learning their own valuation of the policy. We find that subjects on average adjust the voting rule in line with the skewness of the distribution. As a result, a higher share of the achievable surplus can be extracted with the suggested rules than with exogenously given simple majority voting. While the rule choices are not significantly biased towards underor overprotection of the minority, towards majority voting or towards status-quo preserving rules, they only imperfectly reflect the distributions of benefits and costs.
Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their profits. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on a network. The key distortion reducing both total profits and social welfare is multiple-marginalization, which is magnified by strategic interactions. Individual profits are proportional to influentiality, a new measure of network centrality defined by the equilibrium characterization. The results emphasize the importance of the network structure when considering policy questions such as mergers or trade policies.

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