1.
Engelmann, Dirk; Grüner, Hans Peter; Hoffmann, Timo; Possajennikov, Alex (2026). Minority Protection in Voting Mechanisms — Experimental Evidence.
European Economic Review
.Under simple majority voting an absolute majority of voters may choose policies that are harmful to minorities. It is the purpose of sub- and supermajority rules to protect legitimate minority interests. We study how voting rules are chosen under the veil of ignorance and whether there are systematic biases in these choices. In our experiment, individuals choose voting rules for given distributions of gains and losses that can arise from a policy, but before learning their own valuation of the policy. We find that subjects on average adjust the voting rule in line with the skewness of the distribution. As a result, a higher share of the achievable surplus can be extracted with the suggested rules than with exogenously given simple majority voting. While the rule choices are not significantly biased towards under- or overprotection of the minority, towards majority voting or towards status-quo preserving rules, they only imperfectly reflect the distributions of benefits and costs. In expectation this leads to only 63% of the surplus being extracted. The participants are heterogeneous with respect to how well their rule choices adapt to the distribution of valuations, with a large share of the surplus loss caused by a small group of participants.
2.
Jacopo Bizzotto; Toomas Hinnosaar; Adrien Vigier (2026). The Limits of Limited Commitment.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
.We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures, the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to a textbook duopoly model and characterize the commitment structures leading to consumer- and producer-optimal outcomes.
3.
Albornoz, Facundo; Almeyda Torres, Gonzalo; Lombardi, María; Oubiña, Victoria; Lobaton, Pablo Zoido (2026). Remote tutoring in Latin America.
Journal of Development Economics
.We study the effect of a randomized one-on-one remote phone tutoring program implemented between 2021 and 2023. The intervention reached almost seven thousand students in seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. The program targeted students with low initial learning levels and focused on foundational numeracy skills using a differentiated instruction approach. We find that assignment to tutoring increased student test scores by 0.2 SD. Tutoring benefited all students, with no differential effects by gender, age, socioeconomic status, or baseline scores. We find suggestive evidence that students who reported difficulties with concentration or memory may have benefited more. Finally, we find that students with lower initial performance exhibited larger improvements in more basic mathematical operations, whereas those with better performance at baseline saw larger gains in more complex operations. This underscores the importance of offering differentiated instruction based on students’ initial performance.
4.
Facundo Albornoz; Matthias Dahm; Luis Frones; Todd Landman (2026). International Trade and Forced Labor.
Economics and Politics
.We explore the link between trade liberalization and forced labor theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical framework predicts that the net effect of trade on the use of forced labor depends on which sectors improve their relative terms of trade and if openness to trade triggers anti‐forced labor policies in the country or by trade partners. Using two datasets, we show that trade openness increases the intensive margin of forced labor but not the extensive margin. Splitting trade partners by labor standards, we show that trade with high‐standard countries reduces both margins, whereas trade with low‐standard countries raises the intensive margin.
5.
Montero, Maria; Possajennikov, Alex; Verbel, Yuliet (2026). Attribution of responsibility for corrupt decisions.
European Journal of Political Economy
.This paper studies responsibility attribution for outcomes of collusive bribery. In an experiment, participants labeled as either citizens or public officials can propose a bribery transaction to another participant (labeled as either public official or citizen, respectively), who decides whether to accept the proposal. We then let either the victims of the corrupt transaction or the bystanders of it judge the individual decisions of proposing and accepting. We interpret these judgments as a measure of responsibility attribution. We find that labels (citizen or public official) have a stronger effect than positions in the decision sequence (proposer or responder): public officials are consistently regarded as more responsible for corruption than citizens, while those accepting a bribery transaction are regarded as only somewhat more responsible than those proposing it. Further, we find that victims judge corruption decisions more severely than bystanders, although bystanders’ judgments are also consistently negative. In treatments with a neutral context, we find that judgments are less harsh than in the corruption context, bystanders’ judgments are much less harsh than those of victims, and responders are judged more severely than proposers. Our results suggest that people judge corrupt actors in context, more harshly when they are labeled as law enforcers (i.e., public officials), and that unaffected parties (i.e., bystanders) react nearly as negatively to corruption as those directly affected by it (i.e., victims).
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