It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better off as a result. This appears paradoxical, even more so since the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. The example shows that, even though actually being selected to propose is always valuable ex post, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.

Understanding the structure of time preferences allows for accurate predictions of the effects of changing intertemporal incentives. Behavioral models of present bias are used to rationalize field data seemingly at odds with exponential discounting, leveraging additional degrees of freedom to improve in-sample fit. Largely lacking to date are the critical out-of-sample tests necessary to ensure predictive accuracy. This paper contrasts exponential discounting with present-biased procrastination for around 22,000 tax filers, advancing the literature in this domain by providing novel out-of-sample tests for both theories. Present bias provides qualitatively better in-sample fit, matching substantial increases in filing probability as the tax deadline approaches. Present bias also has improved out-of-sample predictive power for responsiveness to the 2008 Stimulus Act, and experimental data demonstrate a link between present bias and filing times. Without present bias, predicted responses to changed incentives are inaccurate, demonstrating its necessity in research and policy applications.

A large theoretical literature argues laws exert a causal effect on norms, but empirical evidence remains scant. Using a novel identification strategy, we provide a compelling empirical test of this proposition. We use incentivized vignette experiments to directly measure social norms relating to actions subject to legal thresholds. Our large-scale experiments (n=7000) run in the UK, US and China show that laws can causally influence social norms. Results are robust across different samples and methods of measuring norms, and are consistent with a model of social image concerns where individuals care about the inferences others make about their underlying prosociality.

Exploiting disaggregated data on French exporters, we show that firms expand their product scope and geographical presence sequentially. This process of internationalization is uneven over time, exhibiting more volatility early than later in the life cycle of exporters. Specifically, young exporters are particularly likely to exit, and if they keep exporting, to expand at the intensive and sub-extensive margins, doing so by widening product scope within a destination before entering new destinations. We also find that firms' core products are particularly resilient despite being used to "test the waters" when entering additional countries. Existing models of firm export dynamics are not designed to explain these empirical regularities. We argue that they can be rationalized by a mechanism where new exporters are uncertain about the profitability of their products in different markets, but learn from their initial export experiences and then adjust their sales, number of products and destination countries accordingly.

The aim of the paper is to determine the effects of the cognitive reserve on brain tumour patients’ cognitive functions and, specifically, if cognitive reserve helps patients cope with the negative effects of brain tumours on their cognitive functions. We retrospectively studied a large sample of around 700 patients, diagnosed with a brain tumour. Each received an MRI brain examination and performed a battery of tests measuring their cognitive abilities before they underwent neurosurgery. To account for the complexity of cognitive reserve, we construct our cognitive reserve proxy by combining three predictors of patients’ cognitive performance, namely, patients’ education, occupation, and the environment where they live. Our statistical analysis controls for the type, side, site, and size of the lesion, for fluid intelligence quotient, and for age and gender, in order to tease out the effect of cognitive reserve on each of these tests. Clinical neurological variables have the expected effects on cognitive functions. We find a robust positive effect of cognitive reserve on patients’ cognitive performance. Moreover, we find that cognitive reserve modulates the effects of the volume of the lesion: the additional negative impact of an increase in the tumour size on patients’ performance is less severe for patients with higher cognitive reserve. We also find substantial differences in these effects depending on the cerebral hemisphere where the lesion occurred and on the cognitive function considered. For several of these functions, the positive effect of cognitive reserve is stronger for patients with lesions in the left hemisphere than for patients whose lesions are in the right hemisphere. The development of prevention strategies and personalized rehabilitation interventions will benefit from our contribution to understanding the role of cognitive reserve, in addition to that of neurological variables, as one of the factors determining the patients’ individual differences in cognitive performance caused by brain tumours.

Is it better to present evidence first or second in trials if witnesses cannot lie, and the litigants share all available witnesses? We address this question by defining preferences over playing games via their equilibrium correspondences. Exploiting this partial ordering over games, we show that litigants cannot prefer to lead, but can prefer to follow; the judge/jury may also prefer some litigant to lead, but only if the litigants each prefer to follow. Allowing a litigant to choose whether to lead after observing the available witnesses does not benefit either that litigant or the judge/jury.

We experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with commonly known money payoffs, the Attraction Effect and Compromise Effect (AE and CE) in bargaining, namely a tendency for bargainers to agree to an intermediate option (CE), or to an option that dominates another option (AE). We conjecture that the relevance of the AE and CE in bargaining is constrained by how focal the feasible agreements' payoffs are. We indeed observe that there are significant AEs and CEs, but these effects are mediated by the efficiency and equality properties of the feasible agreements. Due to the allure of equality, the effects are harder to observe when an equal earnings contract is available. Decoys are more effective in shifting agreements from a very unequal contract to a less unequal one rather than the reverse.

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay if any set of coalitions profits from merging. Even under this strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in the absence of externalities, and symmetric players are not necessarily treated symmetrically in equilibrium. If the grand coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that assigns to each coalition its equilibrium payoff. Compared with the rule of order process of Ray and Vohra (Games Econ Behav 26:286–336, 1999), the bargaining procedure with random proposers tends to give a large advantage to the proposer, whereas the bargaining procedure with a rule of order tends to favor the responders. The equilibria of the two procedures cannot be ranked in general in terms of efficiency.